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Explaining Non-Performing Loans in 
Greece: A Comparative Study on the 
Effects of Recession and Banking Practices 
 
Platon Monokroussos*, Dimitrios D. Thomakos#,  
and Thomas A. Alexopoulosⱡ 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a new dataset of macroeconomic and banking-related variables we attempt 
to explain the evolution of “bad” loans in Greece over the period 2005-2015. Our 
findings suggest that the primary cause of the sharp increase in non-performing 
loans (NPLs) following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis can be mainly 
attributed to the unprecedented contraction of domestic economic activity and 
the subsequent rise in unemployment. Furthermore, our results offer no 
empirical evidence in support of a range of examined hypotheses assuming 
overly aggressive lending practices by major Greek credit institutions or any 
systematic efforts to boost current earnings by extending credit to lower credit 
quality clients. We find that the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to NPLs 
takes place relatively fast, with the estimated magnitude of the respective 
responses being broadly comparable with that documented in some earlier 
studies for other euro area periphery economies. Overall, our results support a 
swift implementation of reforms agreed with official lenders in the context of the 
new (3rd) bailout programme. These envisage the modernization the county’s 
private sector insolvency framework and the creation of a more efficient model 
for the management of NPLs. A vigorous implementation of these reforms is key 
for allowing a resumption of positive credit creation, by freeing up valuable 
resources that are currently trapped in unproductive sectors of the domestic 
economy. This, in turn, would facilitate a speedier return to positive economic 
growth and a gradual reduction in unemployment. 
――――――――――――――― 
*Dr. Platon Monokroussos, Group Chief Economist of Eurobank Ergasias S.A., LSE Hellenic 
Observatory Visiting Senior Fellow 
#Dimitrios D. Thomakos, Professor in Applied Econometrics, University of Peloponnese 
ⱡThomas A. Alexopoulos, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Peloponnese 
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Explaining Non-Performing Loans in 
Greece: A Comparative Study on the 
Effects of Recession and Banking Practices 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Exploring the determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) is an issue of 
great importance for macroeconomic and financial-system stability. A 
large number of recent studies examine the drivers of credit risk, 
especially in the period after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
Some contributions in this field use a single category of potential 
determinants, while others focus on both systematic factors (e.g. 
general macroeconomic conditions) and idiosyncratic influences (e.g. 
bank-specific variables and firm-level information).  
 
Our study utilizes a novel set of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
variables to explain the evolution of bad loans in the Greek banking 
system over the period 2005-2015. The models presented provide a 
suitable framework for analyzing banking sector developments in Greece 
and, by extension, in other euro area economies that were particularly 
hit by the sovereign debt crisis. Apart from being useful for empirically 
testing a number of relevant hypotheses, they allow the analysis of 
potential feedback effects from ex-post credit risk to the real economy.  
By and large, we believe that our findings constitute an important 
contribution to the literature. First, Greece has been particularly hit by 
the crisis, with draconian fiscal austerity measures being implemented in 
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recent years to address severe macroeconomic imbalances accumulated 
following the adoption of the euro. In the context of three consecutive 
bailout programmes implemented since mid-2010, a range of 
conventional and unconventional policies has been applied to stabilize 
the country’s economy and fiscal accounts. Arguably, these policies have 
had important consequences for private sector solvency and, by 
implication, for financial system stability.1,2 Therefore, it does not come 
as a surprise that Greece’s current bailout programme features domestic 
financial stability as one of its main pillars, with particular emphasis 
being placed on the management of NPLs and reforms to the domestic 
regulatory and legal framework in dealing with private sector insolvency. 
In view of the above, we believe that a thorough understanding of the 
determinants of credit risk is of utmost importance for designing 
appropriate policies aiming to safeguard macroeconomic and financial 
systemic stability in Greece and in other euro area periphery economies 
in the post-crisis era.  
 
Second, our study features a number of novel aspects compared to a 
few relevant contributions for Greece that appeared in the literature in 
recent years (see e.g. Louzis et al., 2012; Makri et al., 2014; and Makri, 
2015). In more detail, it utilizes a fully-updated set of macroeconomic 
and banking-sector quarterly data spanning the period 2005-2015. This 
                                                 
1
 Over the period 2009-2015, Greece suffered cumulative GDP losses in excess of 25 percentage 
points (ppts), while the unemployment rate has increased by more than 17ppts. In addition, the 
unprecedented (in size and scope) restructuring of privately-held Greek pubic debt (PSI) in early 2012 
completely wiped out the capital base of Greek banks, necessitating a major recapitalization of the 
domestic banking system in  the following year. Two additional recapitalizations of systemic Greek 
banks followed (in 2014 and 2015) to address severe liquidity and solvency problems faced by these 
institutions due to the sizeable drawdown of deposits and the sharp increase in bad loans.    
2
 Since 2008, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in Greece recorded a cumulative 
increase of ca 31ppts, hitting around 36 percent at the end of 2015.  
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time-horizon covers a significant part of the high growth period that 
followed the country’s euro area entry as well as the years after the 
outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in late 2009/early 2010. In 
more detail, we examine the evolution of realized credit risk by looking 
at a supervisory set of quarterly data for aggregate (banking system-
wide) non-performing loans3 as well as the respective data for 
consumer, mortgage and corporate loans. In contrast to earlier studies 
for Greece, which mostly analyze problem loans excluding 
restructurings, we also look at the determinants of non-performing loans 
that include restructured loans.4 This has been possible by working with 
an entirely new set of data compiled by the Bank of Greece and 
constitutes a quite interesting aspect of our study, as it allows us to also 
look at the evolution of restructured loans.  
 
Third, compared to the data panel estimation methods that have been 
mostly used in earlier studies, we estimate a number of vector error 
correction (VEC) and vector autoregession (VAR) models. This gives us 
the additional advantage of addressing potential endogeneity issues. 
Furthermore, it allows us to fully capture the dynamic interactions 
between different types of bad loan determinants and examine the 
feedback of NPLs to other variables, both macroeconomic and banking-
sector specific ones.     
 
                                                 
3
 In our analysis, non-performing loans are defined as bank loans overdue by more than ninety (90) 
days. 
4
 A significant portion of problem loans have been restructured in Greece over the last several years, 
following direct borrower-creditor negotiations to modify their terms. At the end of 2015, the 
outstanding amount of problem loans in domestic banks’ balance sheets stood at c. €98.4bn (or 43.5 
percent of total outstanding loans), while the respective level which excludes restructured loans was 
c. €80.5bn (or 35.6 percent of total loans). So far, loan restructuring has mostly taken the form of 
maturity extensions.  
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In addition to examining the robustness of some earlier empirical 
findings in the context of our extended data set, we test a number of 
new hypotheses that appear to have important policy implications. 
Among others, we empirically document that the primary cause of the 
sharp increase of non-performing loans in Greece following the outbreak 
of the sovereign debt crisis can be mainly attributed to the 
unprecedented contraction of domestic economic activity (and the 
subsequent spike in unemployment) and not to the high rates of 
domestic credit expansion experienced in the initial period following the 
euro adoption. In fact, our findings offer no empirical evidence in 
support of a range of examined hypotheses assuming overly aggressive 
lending practices by major Greek banks or any systematic efforts to 
boost current earnings by extending credit to lower credit quality clients.  
Furthermore, the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to NPLs takes 
place relatively fast, with the estimated magnitude of the respective 
responses being broadly comparable with that documented in the 
earlier literature. For instance, in a bivariate VAR model for the quarterly 
change in the ratio of NPLs (including restructured loans) and real GDP 
growth, the maximum impact of a GDP shock is felt within 3 quarters, 
while the magnitude of the estimated long-term impact is a c. 0.4 
percentage points (ppts) increase in the NPLs ratio per 1 ppt contraction 
in real GDP growth.  
 
In most estimated models we document a significant feedback effect 
running from NPLs to real GDP growth and the unemployment rate. In 
other words, an increase in the NPLs ratio can have a measurable (and 
statistically significant) negative effect on domestic economic activity 
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and employment conditions. Such a two-way causality between bad 
loans and the macro economy has been documented in a number of 
earlier studies (for instance, see Diawan and Rodrik, 1992) and it can 
materialize through e.g. the credit supply channel. In more detail, a high 
volume of bad loans typically implies increased operating costs for their 
monitoring and management as well as higher provisioning, a situation 
that hinders capital adequacy and financing terms for credit institutions. 
These factors may in turn lead to higher lending interest rates and, more 
generally, tighter lending conditions in the economy. Finally, in line with 
some recent empirical studies for Greece (see e.g. Louzis et al., 2012), 
we find that the magnitude (and the significance) of the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on the evolution of NPLs can vary across 
different categories of loans (consumer, mortgage or corporate).  
 
Overall, our results urge for a swift stabilization of domestic economic 
conditions that would allow a cyclical peak in the non-performing loans 
ratio not far from its current (end-2015) level. The rigorous 
implementation of the conditionality underlying the new (3rd) bailout 
programme agreed with official lenders in August 2015 constitutes an 
important prerequisite for attaining this aim. In this context, the 
implementation of agreed reforms for modernizing the county’s private 
sector insolvency framework and for moving towards a more efficient 
model for the management of NPLs is key for allowing a resumption of 
positive credit creation, by freeing up valuable resources that are 
currently trapped in unproductive sectors of the Greek economy.  
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a 
literature review of the macro- and micro-related determinants of NPLs; 
section 3 provides a bird’s eye view on the evolution of problem loans in 
Greece in the years before and after the outbreak of the global crisis; 
section 4 discusses our data and empirical methodology; section 5 
presents our empirical results and their policy implications; and section 6 
offers some concluding remarks.   
  
2. Determinants of non-performing loans: literature review and 
testable hypotheses 
 
Many studies on the causes of bank failures have documented that 
failing institutions usually feature a higher volume of problem loans prior 
to failure and that asset quality constitutes a statistically significant 
predictor of insolvency (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The literature on 
the determinants of credit risk identifies several important categories of 
potential determinants, ranging from macroeconomic and institutional 
factors to bank-specific variables and firm-level information.  
 
Models examining the influence of macroeconomic factors on credit risk 
focus primarily on the relationship between the business cycle and the 
capacity of borrowers to service their loans. The central idea underlying 
these studies is that credit standards undergo a gradual deterioration 
during economic expansion, when credit institutions apply increasingly 
liberal lending policies in their quest for market share (see e.g. Keeton, 
1999 and Fernandez De Lis et al., 2000). These may take the form of 
“negative NPV” strategies, involving lower interest charges and/or 
  10 
increased lending to low credit quality borrowers (Rajan, 1994). Such 
strategies usually backfire during recessionary phases, when credit risks 
actually materialize. Recent studies examining the role of the business 
cycle in the evolution of credit risk include e.g. Borio et al. (2001), 
Quagliarello (2007), Beck et al. (2013) and Climent-Serrano and Pavia 
(2014).     
 
Studies examining the impact of lending strategies use bank-specific 
information as explanatory variables in models analyzing the inter-
temporal evolution of bad loans and/or other measures of ex-post credit 
risk. Such information relates to, among others, loan quality, cost 
efficiency and capitalization of credit institutions, with a number of 
relevant hypotheses having been examined in the literature, starting 
with the seminal work of Berger and DeYoung (1997).  
 
Another strand of the literature looks at firm-specific information to 
account for the idiosyncratic components of credit risk. Relevant studies 
focus on a number of accounting variables as potential determinants of 
bad loans and/or other proxies for corporate credit risk. These include 
e.g. firm sales growth, profitability, funding cost, leverage, asset growth, 
size and age. Contributions belonging to this group of studies include 
e.g. Benito and Young (2001); Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Belaid 
(2014).       
  
Separately, a group of studies looks at the potential impact of the 
business and regulatory environment on the level of banks’ problem 
loans. Such studies examine the significance of various indicators of the 
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quality and the stability of a country’s legal, regulatory, institutional and 
political environment. Among others, relevant measures may include the 
degree of information sharing between creditors and borrowers, the 
legal rights of borrowers and lenders (as reflected in e.g. the presence or 
not of a sound bankruptcy framework) as well as the degree of 
corruption control. Studies examining the impact of such regulatory and 
institutional factors include e.g. La Porta, et al. (1998); Galindo and 
Miller (2001); Jappelli and Pagano (2002); Godlewski (2004) and Djankov 
et al. (2007).   
 
More recently, an increasing number of studies estimate models that 
combine the aforementioned categories of variables in explaining the 
evolution of credit risk. For instance, Quagliarello (2006) combines 
macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants to investigate the 
riskiness (as proxied by the evolution of loan loss provisions and the flow 
of new bad loans ratio) of a large database of Italian intermediaries over 
the period 1985-2002. In a similar vein, Louzis et al. (2012) use a 
balanced panel consisting of supervisory data for the nine largest Greek 
commercial banks to test a number of hypotheses and explain the 
intertemporal evolution of the non-performing loans in Greece over the 
period from Q1 2003 to Q3 2009. Bonfim (2009) uses macroeconomic 
variables and firm-specific information to explain the determinants of 
credit default in the Portuguese banking industry. Separately, Belaid 
(2014) combines macroeconomic and bank-specific variables with a data 
set containing information for more than nine thousand domestic firms 
to explain the loan quality determinants in the Tunisian banking sector 
over the period 2001-2010.  
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Finally, Boudriga et al. (2010) analyze empirically the determinants of 
non-performing loans and the potential impact of both the business and 
the institutional environment on credit risk exposure of banks in the 
MENA region. By looking at a sample of 46 banks in 12 countries over 
the period 2002-2006 they find that credit quality of banks is positively 
affected by the relevance and the quality of credit information published 
by public and private bureaus. Their findings also highlight the 
importance of a sound institutional environment in enhancing bank 
credit quality. According to their analysis, a better control of corruption, 
sound regulatory quality, a better enforcement of the rule of law, and 
free voice and accountability play an important role in reducing NPLs in 
the MENA countries.     
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we elaborate below on the 
first two general categories of potential credit risk determinants; 
namely, macroeconomic factors and bank-specific variables.  
2.1  Macroeconomic determinants of credit risk 
The empirical literature examining the link between credit risk and the 
state of the macro economy dates back to the papers of King and Plosser 
(1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1998). These along with a number of more recent studies generally 
document a negative relationship between macroeconomic conditions 
and non-performing loans (NPLs). A general explanation for this finding 
is as follows: in economic expansions borrowers’ income improves and 
thus, their capacity to service their debts. On the other hand, when 
economic activity slows down, NPLs increase as unemployment rises, 
disposable incomes decline and borrowers face difficulties in repaying 
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their debt obligations (Salas and Suarina, 2002; Rajan and Dhal 2003; 
Jimenez and Saurina, 2005; Pesaran et al., 2006; Quagliarello 2007; Beck 
et al., 2013; and Klein 2013).  
Other macroeconomic variables that potentially affect the debt servicing 
capacity of firms and households and, by implication, banks’ asset 
quality include the unemployment rate, inflation, property prices as well 
as the loan interest rate and the exchange rate. In more detail, many 
empirical studies document a positive link between lending interest 
rates and NPLs, particularly in the case of floating rate loans (see e.g. 
Louzis et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013 and Klein 2013). However, the 
impact of inflation on asset quality may be ambiguous. Higher inflation 
erodes the real value of outstanding debt, thus making debt servicing 
easier. On the other hand, it may reduce real incomes (when prices are 
sticky) and/or instigate an interest rate tightening by the monetary 
authority (Nkusu, 2011). Finally, several studies find a negative link 
between share prices and NPLs, as a pronounced decline in the stock 
market may reflect an expected deterioration in broader 
macroeconomic conditions, a high number of corporate defaults and an 
erosion of collateral values (see e.g. Beck et al., 2013). 
2.2  Bank-specific determinants of credit risk 
 
The lending policies of credit institutions play a central role in the 
evolution of future problem loans. In line with the stylized fact of credit 
pro-cyclicality5, the market share conquest campaigns undertaken by 
credit institutions in conjunction with the income smoothing activities by 
                                                 
5
 Athanasoglou and Daniilidis (2011) suggest that credit pro-cyclicality constitutes an inherent feature 
of both the real and the financial sector of an economy. 
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borrowers in expansionary phases may give rise to inadequate credit 
quality assessments or even worse to “gambling resurrection” policies 
on the part of bank managers (see e.g. Fernandez et al., 2000).6  
 
This situation usually leads to an acceleration of banks’ lending activities 
during periods of positive economic growth, which are often 
accompanied by a gradual loosening of credit standards, especially in the 
more mature stages of the economic upturn. However, the implications 
of worsened credit standards for macroeconomic and financial-system 
stability do not become fully apparent before a new major economic 
downturn materializes.  
 
In an economic recession, the rise of unemployment and the decline in 
household and corporate incomes hinder the debt servicing ability of 
borrowers. To exacerbate things further, the incipient rise in problem 
loans and the decline in collateral values lead to a serious tightening of 
credit conditions as banks become increasingly unwilling to extend new 
credit in an environment characterized by increased information 
asymmetries with respect to the actual credit quality of borrowers. The 
whole situation then gives rise to boom-bust credit cycles that move in 
synch with the economy’s up and down phases or even worse to major 
banking sector crisis as analyzed in e.g. Pesola (2005).  
 
In their influential study, Berger and DeYoung (1997) look at the effect of 
banks’ lending strategies and other activities on asset quality. In more 
                                                 
6
 In this context, “gambling resurrection” policies can be thought as highly speculative lending 
strategies undertaken by bank managers to maximize short-term gains.   
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detail, they examine the relationship between NPLs, cost efficiency and 
capitalization of U.S. commercial banks over the period 1985-94 by 
testing a number of hypotheses concerning the direction of causality 
among these variables. They find a negative link (and a two-way 
causality) between cost efficiency and NPLs as: (i) an exogenous increase 
in non-performing loans - driven by, say, a notable worsening in the 
broader macroeconomic conditions - may lead to a deterioration in 
banks’ cost efficiency as a result of increased operating costs to deal 
with NPLs (“bad luck” hypothesis); and (ii) low cost efficiency may signify 
poor management skills in credit scoring as well as in loan underwriting 
monitoring and control, which, in turn, can lead to higher NPLs (“bad 
management” hypothesis).  
 
An alternative hypothesis (dubbed as “skimping”) advanced by Berger 
and DeYoung (1997), proposes a positive relationship between cost 
efficiency and NPLs. This is on the basis that high cost efficiency may 
reflect limited resources allocated to monitor credit risk, a situation that 
could lead to higher problem loans in the future.  Finally, Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) as well as a number of later studies examine the so-
called “moral hazard” hypothesis, initially proposed by Keeton and 
Morris (1987). The latter hypothesis claims that low capitalization of 
banks leads to higher NPLs as banks’ managers may have an incentive to 
carry riskier loan portfolios. In line with these empirical findings, a 
number of recent studies find support of some of the aforementioned 
hypotheses. 
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2.3  Feedback from NPLs to the real economy 
In a number of empirical studies, the feedback from NPLs to the real 
economy is usually identified through the credit supply channel. For 
instance, a high volume of bad loans typically implies increased 
operating costs for their monitoring and management as well as higher 
provisioning, a situation that hinders capital adequacy and financing 
terms for credit institutions. These factors may in turn lead to higher 
lending interest rates and, more generally, tighter lending conditions in 
the economy (Diawan and Rodrik, 1992). The feedback effects from NPLs 
to the real economy may also work through non-credit supply channels, 
as, for instance, debt overhang can discourage companies from investing 
in new projects since future profits will be shared with the creditors 
(Myers, 1977). 
 
3.  Evolution of problem loans in Greece 
 
In Greece, a country that has experienced one of the most severe and 
prolonged recessions in recent economic history, cumulative real GDP 
losses between Q1 2008 and Q4 2015 amounted to around 26 percent, 
while the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans increased by 
30.9ppts (and by 38.4ppts if restructured loans are also accounted for), 
hitting 35.6 percent (and 43.5 percent, respectively) at the end of that 
period (Figure A). This followed double-digit growth of domestic bank 
lending in the post euro-entry years that led to the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis (Figure B). However, it is important to note that the global 
crisis found Greece’s private sector not particularly over-levered relative 
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to other euro area economies (Figure C). In terms of nominal amounts, 
the total outstanding stock of NPLs (including restructured loans) in 
Greek commercial banks’ balance sheets stood at €98.4bn at the end of 
2015, with corporate bad loans accounting for 57.1 percent of the total 
stock (Figure D). The overwhelming portion of the latter share consists of 
bad debts owed by very small, small and medium-sized firms (Figure E). 
The corresponding percentages for mortgage and consumer problem 
loans were 27.6 and 15.2 at the end of 2015. In terms of provisioning, 
the coverage of NPLs including restructured loans by loan loss reserves 
ranged between 45 and 55 percent during the initial part of our sample 
(Q1 2005 – Q4 2008). The said coverage fell precipitously in the 
following few quarters (hit a low of 31.8 percent in Q4 2009), before 
increasing gradually thereafter and hitting a post-crisis high of 46.4 at 
the end of 2015 (Figure F). Finally, a look at Figure G indicates that the 
flow (here, the quarterly change of the level) of NPLs including 
restructured loans embarked on an upward path after the outbreak of 
the global crisis, hitting a record peak of €13.8bn in Q1 2013. This 
compares with an average quarterly flow of c. €3.5bn in the prior three 
years and can be mainly attributed to the absorption of the balance 
sheets of the Cypriot subsidiaries in Greece by the four Greek systemic 
banks. The pace of increase of the said flow measure declined 
significantly in 2014 (it even recorded a negative reading of c. - €2.4bn in 
Q4 2014), it hit a two-year high in Q1 2015 (€2.35bn) and ended that 
year with a small increase of €0.2bn.  
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Figure A - Greek commercial banks' non-performing loans (with and without restructured loans) to 
total loans ratio in percentage points 
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Source: Bank of Greece 
 
 
Figure B – Annual growth of the outstanding balances of Greek commercial bank loans (before 
provisions) & non-performing loans including restructured loans in percentage points 
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Figure C – Private sector credit to GDP (end-2008)  
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Figure D – Evolution of non-performing loans including restructured loans by major sectors in 
Greece (EUR billions)  
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Figure E – Non-performing corporate exposures to total corporate loans ratio at the end of 2015 
(percentage points)  
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Figure F – Non-performing loans including restructured loans to total loans ratio; loan loss reserves 
to total loans ratio and coverage of non-performing loans (percentage points)  
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Figure G– Quarterly change (flow) of the total outstanding amount of loans classified as bad debt 
including restructured loans (EUR billions)  
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4.  Data and variables 
 
4.1  Data 
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we utilize a novel data set of 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables (quarterly observations) 
spanning the period between Q1 2005 and Q4 2015. Our data sources 
include Bank of Greece, Greece’s statistics agency (EL.STAT.) and 
EUROSTAT.    
4.2  Variables 
Depending on the model specification under examination, the variables 
presented below are expressed in log levels, ratios or percentages in the 
case of interest rates.  
 
Realized credit risk variables  
Many banking variables are potentially able to convey signals about the 
evolution of banks’ riskiness over the business cycle; however, loan loss 
provisions and non-performing loans have generally been considered to 
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be the main transmission channels of macroeconomic shocks to banks’ 
balance sheets (Quagliarello, 2007). For the purpose of our analysis, we 
estimate alternative models featuring the following credit risk variables: 
Non-performing loans: bank loans overdue for more than ninety (90) 
days. For the purposes of our analysis, we utilize supervisory data for the 
aggregate (industry-wide) stock of bad loans as well as the 
corresponding series for consumer, mortgage and corporate loans. The 
respective acronyms we assign to these variables are: TNPL (total stock 
of bad loans); TNPL_CONS (consumer bad loans), TNPL_HOUSE 
(mortgage bad loans); and TNPL_CORP (corporate bad loans).  
Restructured loans ratio: total stock of restructured loans (all types of 
loans) with the respective acronym being:  L_RESTRUCT.  
 
The rest of the variables in our study belong to two broad categories of 
potential explanatory variables of credit risk that have been identified in 
the literature; namely: macroeconomic variables and bank-specific 
variables.   
 
Macroeconomic variables 
Real GDP (RGDP): an aggregate indicator of the state of the macro 
economy and the phase of the business cycle. As explained earlier, we 
would expect a negative relationship between this variable and the ratio 
of bad loans to total loans.  
Labour market conditions: two alternative indicators of labour market 
conditions are examined in the study; namely, unemployment rate as a 
percentage of the total labour force (UNPL) and the total number of 
employed persons in all domestic industries (EMPLOYED). As explained 
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earlier, we would expect a negative relationship between labour market 
conditions and the ratio of bad loans to total loans (positive association 
if the unemployment rate in levels or first differences is used).  
Domestic inflation (INFL): herein proxied by the quarterly change in the 
harmonized consumer price index for Greece. As explained earlier, the 
impact of inflation on future bad debts may be ambiguous.  
Collateral values: index of prices of dwellings, deflated by the 
harmonized inflation rate for Greece (RHP).7 Based on the analysis 
above, we would expect a negative relationship between collateral 
values and NPLs.  
Debt service cost: real interest rate on bank loans calculated using as 
weights the outstanding volumes of domestic monetary financial 
institutions’ loans vis-à-vis euro area private-sector residents (L_RIR); 
the respective acronyms for the real interest rate on consumer, 
mortgage and corporate loans are: L_CONS_RIR, L_HOUSE_RIR and 
L_CORP_RIR.  
 
Bank-specific variables: 
Loans-to-deposits interest rate spread (LD_IRS): this variable may be 
given alternative interpretations e.g. relative competitiveness conditions 
in the loans and deposits market or degree of risk taking on the part of 
domestic credit institutions (positive association with NPLs). 
Growth of the stock of performing loans: loans excluding NPLs and 
restructured loans, with respective acronyms: PERFO_TL_GR (total 
aggregate stock); PERFO_CONS_GR (consumer); PERFO_HOUSE_GR 
(mortgage); and PERFO_CORP_GR (corporate loans); 
                                                 
7
 Bank of Greece publishes a newer index based on apartment prices. However, our study uses the 
historical series of the index of prices of dwellings due to the greater time span of the latter series. 
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Bank solvency and capitalization: industry-wide solvency ratio, 
measured as total common shareholders equity to total bank assets 
(ETA). In line with the literature, the finding of a negative relationship 
between bank solvency and future bad loans may be interpreted as 
empirical evidence supporting the so-called “moral hazard” hypothesis 
i.e., low capitalization of banks may lead to an increase in future NPLs as 
bank managers may have an incentive to carry riskier loan portfolios.  
 
4.3  Methodology 
This section outlines the methodology used in the study, which is mostly 
dictated by the nature of the available data. Since our time series are 
relatively short, we avoid complicated methods that would potentially 
require a larger data sample. We therefore employ an unrestricted 
vector autoregression (VAR) in levels and in differences as well as a 
vector error correction (VEC) model, with the aim to examine the 
robustness of the empirical results and the consistency of the policy 
implications that they imply. In this context, it is important to note that 
our VAR and VEC models are estimated using different underlying data 
(e.g. NPL ratios vs NPLs in levels, respectively), arguably enhancing 
robustness and protecting our analysis from (potentially severe) 
misspecifications.  
The standard VAR model with p lags, when the variables are expressed 
in differences, is written as: 
        , , , ,
1
p
q k t i q k t i t ty A y X u

 

          (1) 
where , ,q k ty is a ( 1)K   column vector, 1( ,..., )k    , 1( ,..., )kB B   are 
( 1)K    column vectors of  intercept terms , iA   are  ( )K K  coefficient 
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matrices, 
tu is . . (0, )i i d N  and tX  is an exogenous pseudo-variable, herein 
the crisis dummy C12  as explained in the next section. The three 
subscripts in the vector of our variables are used to help identify the 
different models and variable combinations as follows.  
 
. , , , ,
, , ,
[ , , , , _ , , _ , _ } ] , 1,...,5
, 0
, 1
, _ & _
, 2
, 3
q k t k t t t t k t t t k t q
k t k t k t
y TNPL UNPL RGDP RHP L RIR ETA LD IRS PERFO RG for q
Total loans k
Corporate Loans k
where TNPL PERFO RG L RIR for q
Mortgages k
Consumer Loans k
 

 


 
 
When we consider a standard VAR with p lags, when the variables are 
expressed in levels, we simply re-write the model of equation (1) 
without the difference operator as:  
           , , 1 ( 1)
1
p
q k t i t i p t p t t
i
y A y A y X u    

                     (2) 
where we add an extra lag term which is required for accurately 
performing causality tests with non-stationary data (the discussion on 
causality testing follows after the presentation of the models). The 
corresponding VEC format of the VAR model is given in standard form as 
well: 
                       
1
, 1
1
p
q t t i t i t ty y y X u


 

                                  (3) 
where ,q ty  is the following  (Kx1) column vector: 
, [ _ _ , _ , _ , _ _ , _ }]q t t t t t ty LOG L TNPL LOG RGDP LOG EMPLOYED LOG L TLOANS L RIR 
 
and  rk(Π)=r with  0<r<K so that   , where  α and β  are ( )K r  
matrices with  ( ) ( )rk a rk b r   and tX  is a vector of exogenous pseudo-
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variables, herein the crisis dummies C12 and D2013 as explained in the 
next section. To test for the presence of co-integration we use the 
approach of Johansen (1991, 1995), using both the maximal eigenvalue 
and trace statistics. The error-correction term, ECT, is expressed in 
generic form as: 
              1 0 0 1 1
( )tECT y c d t c d t                            (4) 
Here we perform pre-testing for identifying where a constant and/or a 
linear term trend should be included in the error correction relationship. 
Depending on whether the co-integrating vector annihilates the trend 
component, we find that the parameters c0 and c1 should not 
simultaneously be included in our estimated specifications. The same 
applies for d0 and d1.  
 
The optimal lag length is chosen by fitting the VAR representation of the 
models sequentially with lag orders max0,1,...,p p  and selecting the value 
that minimizes standard information criteria, with the following (generic) 
format:  
   
~
( ) ln ( ) ( , )uIC p p h p n  
                                  (5) 
where h(p,n) stands for the penalty function
~
1
1
ˆ ˆ( )
T
u t t
t
p T  

   of the 
respective VAR(p) model. Depending on the penalty function that is 
being used, the information criteria are the Akaike Information criterion 
(AIC), the Schwarz criterion (SC) and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ). 
We mostly rely on the latter for selecting the lag length.  
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Finally, we briefly illustrate below the causality testing, which is 
performed in a similar fashion for model specifications in both first 
differences and levels, with the only difference being the presence of the 
extra lag terms in equation (2). Partitioning the vector of interest in m-
dimensional and (K−m)-dimensional sub-vectors
,a ty  and ,ty : 
                         
,
,
a t
t
t
y
y
y
 
  
     and 
11, 12,
21, 22,
1...
i i
i
i i
A A
A i p
A A
 
  
               (6) 
where 
iA  are partitioned in accordance with the partitioning of ty ,  
,a ty does not Granger-cause ,ty if and only if the following hypothesis 
cannot be rejected: 
       12,
: 0 1...o iH A for i p     (7) 
Thus, the null hypothesis is formulated as zero restrictions on the 
coefficients of the lags of a subset of the variables. This is in the form of 
a standard Wald-type test and therefore inference is asymptotically 
normal for both the VAR in differences in equation (1) and the lagged 
differences in the VEC model in equation (3).  However, inference is non-
standard when we consider the VAR in levels in equation (2) and 
therefore we adopt the methodology proposed by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995), which restores asymptotically normal inference in causality 
testing and is robust to the integration and cointegration properties of 
the process. Therefore for equation (2), we apply Granger causality 
testing in the augmented dmax VAR(p) representation, where dmax is 
the maximum order of integration suspected to apply in the VAR. 
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Because our level variables are first order integrated we use an 
augmented (by one lag) VAR(p+1) as shown before.8  
 
A set of standard residual and misspecification tests is applied after the 
estimation of each model, either in VAR or VEC form. Detailed results on 
these tests are available on request. 
5. Empirical analysis and policy implications 
 
5.1  VEC representation 
This section discusses the results of our co-integration analysis and the 
estimates of a number of identified error correction (VEC) models.9  The 
variables examined herein are taken in log levels and include:  
LOG_L_TNPL: logarithm of the level of total (banking sector-wide) non-
performing loans that include restructured loans in billions of euros; 
 LOG_RGDP: logarithm of the level of Greece’s real gross domestic 
product in billions of euros; 
LOG_EMPLOYED: logarithm of the total number of employed individuals 
in all domestic industries in millions of persons; 
LOG_L_TLOANS: logarithm of the level of total outstanding loans 
provided by domestic credit institutions in billions of euros; and  
L_RIR: average weighted loan interest rate deflated by Greece’s 
harmonized index of consumer prices, herein calculated using as weights 
                                                 
8
 While we do not explicitly discuss impulse responses and variance decomposition in the 
methodology section we do note that the presence of causality is a prerequisite for their 
interpretability. This is the reason why we insist on examining the robustness of our causality tests 
across three different kinds of VAR representations, including levels, differences and VEC. 
9
 We present our results with primary focus on the implications of our estimates; causality test results 
and impulse responses are fully available at the tables, but are discussed for illustrative cases and not 
exhaustively. 
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the outstanding volumes of domestic monetary financial institutions’ 
loans vis-à-vis euro area private-sector residents.   
 
The results of our Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
indicate that all of the aforementioned variables represent non-
stationary I(1) processes.10  Furthermore, the implementation of VAR-
based co-integration tests using the methodology developed in Johansen 
(1991, 1995) indicates the existence of one or more co-integrating 
relationships in different combinations of the variables under 
examination (results are available on request). 
 
The estimates of our vector error correction (VEC) specifications are 
reported in Table 1.1 (models N1 to N5). The first part of the table 
(under the heading “Co-integrating Equations”) reports the results from 
the first step Johansen procedure and shows the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the co-integrated variables of interest. Calculated 
t-statistics based on the estimated asymptotic standard errors 
(corrected for degrees of freedom) are reported below the estimated 
coefficients.  
 
The rest of Table 1.1 has the usual interpretation. The lines under the 
heading “Error Correction Terms” show the estimated coefficient(s) of 
the error correction term(s) and effectively constitute speed of 
adjustment parameters. Similarly, the lines under the heading “Pseudo-
Variables” show the coefficients of the dummy variables c12 and d2013. 
                                                 
10
 Care must be taken in interpreting the results of such tests due to the limited sample size; unit root 
tests are not the best power performers. This is one of the reasons that we have opted to estimate 
more than one kind of models from the VAR family. 
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In our study, c12 is defined as a crisis dummy that takes the value 1 from 
Q1 2012 onwards and the value zero (0) otherwise, while d2013 takes 
the value 1 in Q1 2013 and the value zero in all other quarters. The latter 
dummy is meant to capture the effects of the one-off spike recorded in 
the level of non-performing loans in the first quarter of 2013 due to the 
absorption by the four Greek systemic banks of the balance sheets of the 
Cypriot subsidiaries operating in Greece following the outbreak of the 
Cypriot banking crisis. The usual goodness of fit measures R2 and 
Adjusted-R2 as well as the VEC Schwartz Criterion are reported below the 
heading “Statistics”, while Table 1.2 shows the results of the relevant 
Granger causality tests.   
 
Table 1.1 Estimation results from Error Correction Models N1 to N5. (Source: The Authors) 
 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
 Cointegrating Equation 
LOG_L_TNPL(-1) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
t-statistic - - - - - 
LOG_RGDP(-1) -4.12 
 
-5.39 
  t-statistic 4.66 
 
14.94 
  LOG_EMPLOYED(-1) 
 
-2.17 
 
-2.49 -5.44 
t-statistic 
 
1.73 
 
3.27 8.09 
LOG_L_TLOANS(-1) 
  
2.70 1.87 
 t-statistic 
  
-14.94 -3.84 
 L_RIR(-1) 
    
0.05 
t-statistic 
    
2.94 
@TREND(05Q1) 0.03 0.05 
  
-0.04 
t-statistic -4.12 -7.39 
  
-10.94 
C 19.21 5.26 10.34 -2.46 -10.46 
Error Correction Term 
Coint. Eq. 0.02 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06 0.07 
t-statistic 0.36 -2.20 -4.27 -3.35 0.86 
Pseudo-Variables 
D2013 
       
0.14 
   
t-statistic 
       
3.98 
   
C12 -0.02 -0.03 
      
-0.01 
t-statistic -1.56 -1.79 
      
-0.11 
Statistics 
Single R
2
's 0.39 0.50 0.54 0.66 0.34 
Single Adjusted R
2
's 0.28 0.37 0.49 0.59 0.25 
VEC's Shwartz Criterion -7.70 -8.76 -12.50 -13.56 -5.89 
* All variables are in log levels   
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Table 1.2 P-values of the modified Wald-Test for causality for Error Correction Models N1 to N5.  
(Source: The Authors) 
 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
D(LOG_L_TNPL)   0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.95 0.28 
 
0.13 0.21 
 
0.78 0.84 
D(LOG_RGDP) 0.02 
   
0.16 
        
D(LOG_EMPLOYED) 
 
 
0.23 
    
0.01 
 
0.01 0.06 
 
0.19 
D(LOG_L_TLOANS) 
 
   
0.93 0.31 
 
0.08 0.01 
    
D(L_RIR) 
 
         
0.80 0.67 
 
* All  variables are in logs of levels   
 
The first part of Table 1.1 indicates that all macroeconomic variables 
under examination have the correct theoretical sign and are statistically 
significant.  
 
In more detail, the level of non-performing loans including restructured 
loans is negatively affected by (i.e., increases with) a slowdown in 
economic activity (models: N1 & N3) or a decline in the number of 
employed persons (models: N2, N4 & N5). This result confirms the 
importance of macroeconomic conditions for the evolution of bad debts 
and is in line with the findings of a number of recent empirical studies 
(see e.g. Salas and Suarina, 2002; Rajan and Dhal, 2003; Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2005; Pesaran et al., 2006; Quagliarello 2007; Beck et al., 2013; 
Klein 2013; and  Louzis et al., 2012). Again, the general explanation for 
the countercyclical behavior of bad loans relates to the procyclicality of 
the demand and the supply of bank credit as well as the difficulties faced 
by borrowers in servicing their debt obligations when macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate, unemployment rises and disposable incomes 
decline.  
 
The estimated coefficient of the real interest rate in the estimated long-
run equilibrium relationship of model N5 is statistically significant and 
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has the correct theoretical sign (positive). This finding is also in line with 
the earlier literature (see e.g. Louzis et al., 2012, Beck et al., 2013; and 
Klein 2013) and reflects the increased difficulty faced by borrowers in 
meeting their loan obligations when servicing costs increase.  
 
The level of total loans enters the long-run equilibrium relationship with 
a positive (and significant) sign as regards its relationship with the level 
of non-performing loans (models N3 & N4). This is in line with what one 
should expect, given that an increase in the amount of loans provided by 
domestic banks increases the chances that a higher volume of loans will 
go bust when economic conditions deteriorate. 
 
An interesting finding related to the estimates of model N3 is that the 
long-run effect (in absolute terms) of the level of real GDP on the level of 
non-performing loans is found to be around double in magnitude of the 
effect of loans provided by the domestic banking system. This is verified 
by testing the following restriction in the long-run co-integrating 
equation:  
                    coefficientLOG_RGDP + 2* coefficientLOG_L_TLOANS = 0                    (1)  
 
The relevant Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic for the testing of the above 
restriction is asymptotically distributed at chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of cointegrating equation (herein, equal to 
1). In our case, the estimated chi-square (1) value is 0.235 (probability: 
0.628), which means that the imposed restriction cannot be rejected at 
usual confidence levels.   
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A potential interpretation of the above result is as follows: in Greece’s 
case, past experience suggests that aggregate economic activity (herein, 
proxied by real GDP) is much more important than the outstanding stock 
of bank credit in determining the level of non-performing loans in the 
long-run equilibrium. In turn, this highlights the importance of restoring 
the conditions for positive and sustainable economic growth for 
improving private-sector solvency. This result is also in agreement with 
the argument made in Sector 3 that the crisis found Greece’s private 
sector not particularly over levered relative to other euro area (and non-
EA EU) economies, as least as regards the respective ratios of 
outstanding private-sector credit to GDP.  
 
Taking model N1 to be our baseline specification, we document a bi-
directional causality between the level of non-performing loans 
(LOG_L_TNPL) and the level of real GDP (LOG_L_RGDP). In more detail, 
as the Granger Causality tests of Table 1.2 indicates, TNPLs are Granger 
caused by RGDP at a 2.1% significance level, while RGDP is Granger 
caused by TNPLs at a significance level of 1%. Stating it differently, each 
variable is better explained by both the lagged values of TNPLs and RGDP 
than by its own lags alone. Reported results of Granger causality tests 
implemented in models N2 to N6 have an analogous interpretation.  
 
Tables 1.3 portrays the estimated impulse-response functions that trace 
the effects of a Cholesky one standard deviation (1 S.D.) shock to one of 
the endogenous variables on the other variables of VEC models N1 to 
N5. Finally, Table 1.4 shows the respective variance decomposition, 
which provides information about the relative importance of each 
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random innovation in affecting the variables in the VECs. For model N2, 
over a forecast horizon of 10 quarters (2.5 years), up to 57 percent of 
the forecast error variance in the LOG_L_TNPL variable can be explained 
by its own shocks, with the remaining 43 percent being due to shocks in 
the other variable (herein, LOG_EMPLOYED).  
 
Table 1.3 Impulse Response Analyses to Cholesky’s one s.d. shock in ten Quarters ahead for Error 
Correction Models N1 to N5.  (Source: The Authors) 
ECM 
Dependent 
Variable 
LOG_L_TNPL(%) LOG_RGDP(%) LOG_EMPLOYED(%) LOG_L_TLOANS(%) L_RIR(%) 
N1 
LOG_L_TNPL 0.11 0.00    
LOG_RGDP -0.02 0.00    
N2 
LOG_L_TNPL 0.07  -0.09   
LOG_EMPLOYED -0.02  0.03   
N3 
LOG_L_TNPL 0.03 -0.03  0.09  
LOG_RGDP 0.00 0.02  -0.02  
LOG_L_TLOANS 0.01 0.03  0.02  
N4 
LOG_L_TNPL 0.02  -0.03 0.00  
LOG_EMPLOYED 0.01  0.04 0.00  
LOG_L_TLOANS -0.05  0.04 0.05  
N5 
LOG_L_TNPL 0.11  -0.01  0.04 
LOG_EMPLOYED -0.02  0.01  -0.01 
L_RIR -0.34  -0.92  0.90 
 
 
Table 1.4 Variance Decomposition Analyses in ten Quarters ahead for Error Correction Models N1 to 
N5.  (Source: The Authors) 
ECM 
Dependent 
Variable 
LOG_L_TNPL(%) LOG_RGDP(%) LOG_EMPLOYED(%) LOG_L_TLOANS(%) L_RIR(%) 
N1 
LOG_L_TNPL 97.10 2.90    
LOG_RGDP 74.35 25.65    
N2 
LOG_L_TNPL 57.13  42.87   
LOG_EMPLOYED 36.74  63.26   
N3 
LOG_L_TNPL 26.43 8.33  65.24  
LOG_RGDP 1.01 80.69  18.31  
LOG_L_TLOANS 7.59 24.19  68.21  
N4 
LOG_L_TNPL 77.79  19.42 2.79  
LOG_EMPLOYED 2.81  96.12 1.07  
LOG_L_TLOANS 38.92  18.03 43.05  
N5 
LOG_L_TNPL 90.82  1.83  7.35 
LOG_EMPLOYED 32.13  35.63  32.24 
L_RIR 3.28  44.82  51.90 
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5.2  VAR representation 
This section discusses the estimates of our vector autoregression (VAR) 
models, which analyze the dynamic impact of random disturbances on 
systems incorporating various combinations of the variables under 
examination. Compared to the data panel estimation techniques that 
have been extensively used in the literature to analyze the determinants 
of non-performing loans, the VAR methodology has the advantage of 
addressing the issue of potential endogeneity (by treating all variables as 
endogenous) and of fully capturing the dynamic interactions between 
the different types of determinants.  
 
The variables utilized in the analysis presented in this section include:  
TNPL: ratio of the aggregate (banking sector-wide) outstanding stock of 
non-performing loans including restructured loans to the total 
outstanding stock of loans provided by Greek credit institutions. 
TNPL_CONS; TNPL_HOUSE; and TNPL_CORP represent the respective 
ratios for consumer, mortgage and corporate non-performing loans 
including restructured loans.  
L_RESTRUCT: ratio of the total stock of restructured loans (all types of 
loans).  
RGDP: real GDP growth (quarterly); 
RHP: real growth of housing prices (quarterly); 
UNPL: Greece’s unemployment rate as a percent of the total labour 
force.  
EMPLOYED: quarterly growth of the total number of employed persons.   
INFL: quarterly growth of the harmonized consumer price index for 
Greece.  
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L_RIR: real interest rate on bank loans (calculated using as weights the 
outstanding volumes of domestic monetary financial institutions’ loans 
vis-à-vis euro area private-sector residents).  L_CONS_RIR, L_HOUSE_RIR 
and L_CORP_RIR are the respective acronyms for the real interest rate 
on consumer, mortgage and corporate loans.  
LD_IRS: loans-to-deposits interest rate spread.  
PERFO_TL_RG; PERFO_CONS_RG, PERFO_HOUSE_RG and 
PERFO_CORP_RG):  respective real quarterly growth of the stock of 
total, consumer, mortgage and corporate performing loans (net of 
provisions).  
ETA: solvency ratio (banking sector-wide), measured as total common 
shareholders equity to total bank assets.  
C12: crisis dummy taking the value of 1 from Q1 2012 onwards and 0 
otherwise.  
C13: dummy variable taking the value 1 in Q1 2013 and the value zero in 
all other quarters.  
 
In our VAR model specifications, some of the above variables enter in 
first differences so as to address any non-stationarity issues (variables in 
first differences are preceded by the letter D). For instance, D(TNPL) 
denoted the quarterly change in the ratio of non-performing loans 
including restructured loans.  
 
All estimated VAR models presented in this sector pass the usual 
diagnostic tests as regards model specification and stability, selected lag 
length as well as residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and 
normality (all results are available on request).  
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5.2.1  NPL VARs with macro determinants   
The estimates of our VAR models for the ratio of total NPLs including 
restructured loans (all sectors) as well as for the respective ratios for 
consumer, mortgage and corporate loans are reported in Tables 2.1 to 
2.4. The results of a series of relevant causality tests are also reported in 
the aforementioned tables, confirming the efficacy of the models under 
examination.  In most cases, the estimated coefficients have the correct 
theoretical sign and are statistically significant. 
Table 2.1 Estimated VAR models for aggregate non-performing loans (Source: The Authors) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL(-1)) 0.21 -0.12 0.18 0.71 
t-statistic 1.36 -0.97 1.05 6.23 
RGDP(-1) -0.17 0.14   
t-statistic -2.43 1.92   
RHP(-1)  
-0.3 
 
-0.16 
t-statistic  
-4.24 
 
-2.19 
D(UNPL(-1))  
0.94 0.60 
 
t-statistic  
4.51 3.45 
 
D(L_RIR(-1))  
0.34 
  
t-statistic  
2.94 
  
D(LD_IRS(-1))    
-0.15 
t-statistic    
-0.23 
PERFO_TL_GR(-1))   
-0.07 
 
t-statistic   
-1.83 
 
D(TNPL(-2)) 0.31    
t-statistic 2.26    
RGDP(-2) -0.16    
t-statistic -2.11    
C 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
t-statistic 1.82 1.37 2.78 1.48 
Pseudo-Variables 
C12 
  
0.01 
      t-statistic     2.76             
Causalities Wald-Test (P-Values) 
D(TNPL) 
 
0.66 
 
0.75 0.03 0.7 0.57 
 
0.28 0.30 
 
0.41 0.30 
RGDP 0.00 
 
0.06 
 
0.84 0.87 0.94 
      RHP 
  
0.00 0.34 0.73 
 
0.89 
   
0.02 
 
0.09 
D(UNPL) 
  
0.00 0.15 
 
0.03 0.92 0.00 
 
0.03 
   D(L_RIR) 
  
0.00 0.89 0.20 0.84 
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D(LD_IRS) 
          
0.82 0.02 
 PERFO_TL_GR               0.07 0.55         
*Variables are expressed in either ratios or growth rates  
 
 
Table 2.2 Estimated VAR models for non-performing consumer loans. (Source: The Authors) 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_CONS(-1)) 0.16 0.07 -0.14 0.67 
t-statistic 0.94 0.40 -0.74 5.61 
RGDP(-1) -0.31 0.06   
t-statistic -2.61 0.49   
RHP(-1)  
-0.32 
 
-0.19 
t-statistic  
-2.66 
 
-1.91 
D(UNPL(-1))  
0.82 0.94 
 
t-statistic  
2.46 3.78 
 
D(L_CONS_RIR(-1))  
0.19 
  
t-statistic  
0.98 
  
D(LD_IRS(-1))    
0.04 
t-statistic    
0.04 
PERFO_CONS_GR(-1))   
-0.14 
 
t-statistic   
-2.93 
 
D(TNPL_CONS(-2)) 0.03    
t-statistic 0.18    
RGDP(-2) -0.34    
t-statistic -2.80    
C 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
t-statistic 2.97 3.05 4.22 1.76 
Pseudo-Variables 
C12     0.00 
      t-statistic     -0.70             
Causalities Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_CONS) 
 
0,03 
 
0.01 0.11 0.01 0.35 
 
0.02 0.09 
 
0.79 0.47 
RGDP 0,00 
 
0.63 
 
0.99 0.63 0.81 
      
D(UNPL) 
  
0.01 0.44 
  
0.53 0.00 
 
0.01 
   
RHP 
  
0.01 0.64 
  
0.35 
   
0.06 
 
0.10 
D(L_CONS_RIR) 
  
0.33 0.88 0.05 0.81 
       
D(LD_IRS) 
    
0.92 0.27 
    
0.97 0.02 
 
PERFO_CONS_GR 
       
0.00 0.21 
    
*Variables are expressed in either ratios or growth rates 
 
 
Table 2.3 Estimated VAR models for non-performing corporate loans. (Source: The Authors) 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_CORP(-1)) 0.30 0.08 0.36 0.73 
t-statistic 1.90 0.55 2.30 6.60 
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RGDP(-1) -0.19 0.17 
  
t-statistic -2.31 1.73 
  
RHP(-1) -0.17 -0.29 
 
-0.19 
t-statistic -2.17 -3.34 
 
-2.33 
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
0.85 0.60 
 
t-statistic 
 
3.13 3.01 
 
D(L_CORP_RIR(-1)) 
 
0.38 
  
t-statistic 
 
2.64 
  
D(LD_IRS(-1)) 
   
-0.35 
t-statistic 
   
-0.51 
PERFO_CORP_GR(-
1))   
-0.04 
 
t-statistic 
  
-1.08 
 
D(TNPL_CORP(-2)) 0.30 
   
t-statistic 2.10 
   
RGDP(-2) -0.15 
   
t-statistic -1.81 
   
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 1.07 -0.28 1.65 1.17 
Pseudo-Variables 
C12 
  
0.01 
      
t-statistic 
  
1.94 
      
Causalities Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_CORP) 
 
0.95 
 
0.47 0.15 0.63 0.31 
 
0.56 0.12 
 
0.12 0.99 
RGDP 0.01 
 
0.08 
 
0.95 0.93 0.73 
      
D(UNPL) 
  
0.00 0.05 
 
0.00 0.74 0.00 
 
0.00 
   
RHP 
  
0.00 0.17 0.40 
 
0.96 
   
0.00 
 
0.29 
D(L_CORP_RIR) 
  
0.00 0.76 0.12 0.88 
       
D(LD_IRS) 
          
0.36 0.06 
 
PERFO_CORP_GR 
       
0.28 0.68 
    
*Variables are expressed in either ratios or growth rates  
 
 
Table 2.4 Estimated VAR models for non-performing mortgage loans. (Source: The Authors) 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_HOUS(-1)) 0.27 0.03 0.11 0.25 
t-statistic 1.71 0.17 0.58 1.62 
RGDP(-1) -0.14 0.01 
  
t-statistic -2.07 0.12 
  
RHP(-1) 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.21 
t-statistic 
 
-1.89 
 
-3.22 
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
0.53 0.41 
 
t-statistic 
 
2.52 2.67 
 
D(L_HOUS_RIR(-1)) 
 
0.22 
  
t-statistic 
 
1.65 
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D(LD_IRS(-1)) 
   
0.37 
t-statistic 
   
0.67 
PERFO_HOUS_GR(-1)) 
  
-0.06 
 
t-statistic 
  
-1.89 
 
D(TNPL_HOUS(-2)) 0.13 
   
t-statistic 0.89 
   
RGDP(-2) -0.11 
   
t-statistic -1.55 
   
C 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
t-statistic 2.64 2.25 3.10 2.81 
Pseudo-Variables 
C12 
   
0.01 
     
t-statistic 
   
2.26 
     
Causalities Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
D(TNPL_HOUS) 
 
0.27 
 
0.06 0.13 0.01 0.82 
 
0.16 0.18 
 
0.00 0.94 
RGDP 0.04 
 
0.90 
 
0.90 0.90 0.91 
      
D(UNPL) 
  
0.01 0.15 
 
0.75 0.82 0.01 
 
0.25 
   
RHP 
  
0.06 0.67 0.67 
 
0.85 
   
0.00 
 
0.28 
D(L_HOUS_RIR) 
  
0.10 0.75 0.75 0.33 
       
D(LD_IRS) 
          
0.50 0.00 
 
PERFO_HOUS_GR 
       
0.06 0.53 
    
*Variables are expressed in either ratios or growth rates 
          
 
In the VAR equations featuring non-performing loans as the left-hand 
side variable, the estimated coefficient of the first lag of NPLs is mostly 
positive, but insignificant (same result applies for models including more 
than one lags). The positive sign documented here is broadly in line with 
the findings of some earlier studies for other euro area economies; see 
e.g. relevant contributions for Italy by Salas and Saurina (2002); and 
Quagliarello (2007). The positive persistence of bad loans can be 
explained on the basis that it usually takes some time for NPLs to be 
written off banks’ balance sheets. It should be noted though that our 
results appear to be in some disagreement with those presented in an 
earlier empirical analysis on Greek NPLs conducted by Louzis et al. 
(2012). Using a balanced data panel consisting of supervisory data for 
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the nine (9) largest Greek commercial banks spanning the period Q1 
2003 to Q3 2009, these authors document a negative and significant 
coefficient of the lagged NPLs variable for the case of consumer and 
corporate loans, along with an insignificant coefficient for mortgage 
loans. They explain this finding on the basis that NPLs are likely to 
decrease when they have increased in the previous quarter, due to 
write-offs. On the other hand, they interpret the insignificant coefficient 
for lagged mortgage NPLs as evidence supporting the view that macro 
fundamentals play a greater role in driving this particular category of bad 
debts. Overall, we would not be overly concerned about this deviation of 
empirical findings, given that we are using a different methodological 
approach. Furthermore, in contrast to Louzis et al. (2012), our study 
looks at aggregate (system-wide) NPL series that include restructured 
loans and also spans a different time period (Q1 2005 to Q4 2015).  
 
In the majority of models, the coefficient of the lagged quarterly change 
in the unemployment rate, D(UNPL), or, alternatively, that of the 
quarterly growth of total employment, EMPLOYED, has the correct 
theoretical sign (positive and negative, respectively) and is statistically 
significant. This result can be also inferred by looking at the respective 
impulse response functions in Figures 2.1 to 2.4. This finding is in 
agreement with many empirical studies in the literature (see e.g. 
Quagliarello, 2007; Beck et al., 2013; Klein, 2013) and its rationale is in 
line with the analysis presented earlier in this document (see e.g. Section 
5.1). Finally, our pairwise causality tests reject both of the following null 
hypotheses: a) respective labour market variable does not Granger 
causes NPLs; and b) NPLs do not Granger cause labour market 
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conditions. This  provides statistical evidence supporting the existence of 
a negative feedback effect running from NPLs to the labour market and 
highlights the importance of the former variable in safeguarding both 
financial-system and macroeconomic stability.  
 
In a similar fashion, the coefficient(s) of lag real GDP growth is negative, 
though its significance diminishes in models that also include other 
aggregate proxies of real economic activity, such as lagged labour 
market variables and/or real growth of residential house prices. The 
finding of a negative coefficient for real GDP growth is broadly in line 
with what the relevant empirical literature suggests and confirms the 
procyclical behavior of bad loans. For instance, the estimates of a 
bivariate VAR for the ratio of non-performing loans and real GDP growth 
(model M1 in Tables 2.1 to 2.5) suggest that the transmission of GDP 
shocks to NPLs is relatively fast (here the maximum impact is felt within 
3 quarters), with the estimated magnitude of the respective long-term 
impact being broadly comparable with that documented in some earlier 
studies. According to our estimates, a decline of real GDP growth by 1 
ppt leads to a c. 0.40 ppts increase in the TNPLs ratio in the long run. 
Note that in their studies on the determinants of bad loans in Italy, Salas 
and Saurina (2002) and Quagliarello (2007) estimate a long term 
elasticity of c. 0.33 of NPLs with respect to GDP. Notably, our pairwise 
causality tests on the bivariate VAR model for NPLs and real GDP confirm 
the importance of the latter variable in determining future bad debts. 
However, rather surprisingly, they fail to reject the null that the NPLs 
ratio does not cause real GDP growth. This is a rather odd result but its 
significance and meaning is negated by the documented existence of a 
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reverse causality running from NPLs to the unemployment rate (see 
earlier paragraph) and/or the real growth of housing prices (see Tables 
2.1-2.4).  
 
The coefficient of the lagged real growth of residential house prices is 
also found to have the correct theoretical sign (negative) and to be 
statistically significant in most estimated models (see relevant Granger 
causality tests in Tables 2.1-2.4 and respective impulse-responses in 
Figures 2.1-2.4). Apart from being a coincident indicator for the phase of 
the business cycle (negative association with NPLs), the RHP variable 
may be used to examine an alternative hypothesis. This can be stated as 
follows: in periods of increased collateral valuations, banks may be 
tempted to reduce their screening activity making their portfolios riskier 
(Quagliarello, 2007). The latter would instead imply a positive 
association between NPLs and collateral valuations. For the case of 
Greece, our results do not provide empirical evidence in favor of the 
latter hypothesis.  
 
Figure 2.1 Impulse Response of TNPL to Cholesky’s one s.d. RGDP innovation for VAR model M1.  
(Source: The Authors)  
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Figure 2.2 Impulse Response of TNPL to Cholesky’s one s.d. D(UNDP) innovation for VAR model M2. 
(Source: The Authors)  
 
-.0004
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
.0016
.0020
.0024
.0028
.0032
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPL) to D(UNPL) Innovation
   
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
.0030
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_HOUSE) to D(UNPL) Innovation
 
 
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_CORP) to D(UNPL) Innovation
   
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_CONS) to D(UNPL) Innovation
 
 
 
 
 
 
  44 
Figure 2.3 Impulse Response of TNPL to Cholesky’s one s.d. PEFRO_GR innovation for VAR model M3. 
(Source: The Authors) 
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Figure 2.4 Impulse Response of TNPL to Cholesky’s one s.d. D(LD_IRS)  innovation for VAR model M4. 
(Source: The Authors) 
 
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPL) to D(LD_IRS) Innovation
   
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_HOUSE) to  D(LD_IRS) Innovation
 
 
 
 
  45 
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_CORP) to  D(LD_IRS) Innovation
   
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(TNPE_CONS) to  D(LD_IRS) Innovation
 
 
 
 
RHP may also be used to examine the extent to which equity has been 
extracted from borrowers’ homes, especially over the period of strong 
domestic bank lending in the pre-crisis years. This is a phenomenon that 
has actually been documented in more sophisticated and developed 
markets, such as the US housing market in the years preceding the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis. In the case of Greece, there is 
some anecdotal evidence that certain homeowners were indeed 
borrowing against their home equity to boost consumption or to simply 
service debts owed to other creditors. Such loans were usually taken in 
the form of mortgage loans (for e.g. home improvements) so as to 
benefit from the more favorable terms offered to the latter relative to 
consumer loans. In the analysis presented below, we do find that lagged 
growth of real housing prices has a comparatively larger effect on 
consumer loans than on corporate or mortgage loans. To the extent that 
it captures more idiosyncratic effects than merely the effect of the 
business cycle this finding may be interpreted as providing some 
preliminary evidence in favor of what we describe as the “home equity 
cashing out” hypothesis. However, we admit that the latter result 
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deserves further analysis and we leave that for one of our future 
projects.  
 
The effect of the lagged inflation rate on NPLs has been found to be 
ambiguous in sign and statistically insignificant in all estimated models 
(results available on request). This is broadly in agreement with the 
finding of a number of recent empirical studies (see e.g. Nkusu, 2011). 
On the one hand, higher inflation erodes the real value of outstanding 
debt, thus making debt servicing easier. On the other hand, it may 
reduce real incomes (when prices are sticky) and/or instigate an interest 
rate tightening by the monetary authority. In our study, we find no 
conclusive evidence in favor of either of the aforementioned 
hypotheses.  
The coefficients of our loan service cost variables, L_RIR (and the 
respective ones for consumer, mortgage and corporate loans, 
L_CONS_RIR; L_HOUSE_RIR; and L_CORP_RIR) have the correct 
theoretical sign (positive) and are statistically significant in most 
estimated models. In our analysis, the aforementioned variables enter in 
first-differences (quarterly change in the respective real loan interest 
rate), alleviating concerns related to the fact that interest rates are 
usually higher in expansionary phases, when NPLs tend to be low 
(negative association). In any case, the inclusion in our macro VAR 
models of the loan service cost variables in levels does not generally 
alter the sign (or the significance) of the estimated coefficients (results 
available on request). Furthermore, a casual look at the evolution of 
these variables in levels shows that, with the exception of a significant 
decline experienced in 2010, real loan rates have been on an upward 
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path in more recent years due to strengthening disinflation and the 
excessive tightness of domestic lending market conditions. At the end of 
2015 (latest part of our data sample), real lending rates were higher 
relative to their levels in the pre-crisis period under examination. 
 
5.2.2  NPL VARs with banking sector specific determinants  
 
We continue our analysis by presenting the results for some model 
specifications that include (along with the NPLs ratio) either a number of 
banking variables or a combination of macro and banking-specific 
determinants. In more detail, we examine the following variables: 
quarterly change in the interest rate spread between loans and deposits, 
LD_IRS; quarterly growth of the stock of performing loans i.e., loans 
excluding NPLs and restructured loans, with respective acronyms, 
PERFO_TL_GR (for the total aggregate stock); PERFO_CONS_GR (for 
consumer); PERFO_HOUSE_GR (for mortgage); and PERFO_CORP_GR 
(for corporate loans); and quarterly change in the (banking sector-wide) 
solvency ratio, measured as total common shareholders equity to total 
bank assets.  
 
In most cases, the coefficients of the aforementioned banking sector-
related variables are found to be either statistically insignificant or 
altering only marginally the impact of the macro variables relative to the 
estimates produced by the macro VAR models presented in the previous 
section (Tables 2.1-2.4 and impulse-responses in Figures 2.1-2.4). On the 
one hand, this highlights the primary importance of the business cycles 
in determining the evolution of NPLs in Greece. This result can be 
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visualized by looking at the estimated forecast error variance 
decompositions of VAR models containing both macro and bank specific 
determinants (results are available on request). Our results confirm that 
random innovations in macro variables are generally much more 
important than these in bank-specific variables in affecting the total 
variability of NPLs. On the other hand, it provides inconclusive evidence 
as regards some of the relevant hypotheses examined in the literature of 
bank-specific determinants of credit risk (see e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 
1997). Having said that, we note that the scope of our analysis is 
somewhat constrained by the fact that our data set lacks income 
statement information and thus, it does not allow us to construct 
relevant cost efficiency indicators for the domestic banking system. 
  
As noted earlier, the interest rate spread between loans and deposits 
could be given alternative interpretations related to e.g. competitiveness 
conditions in the loans and deposits markets or degree of risk taking on 
the part of domestic credit institutions (positive association with NPLs). 
In our study, the coefficient(s) of the lagged LD_IRS variable are found to 
be mostly negative and insignificant, thus providing no empirical 
evidence in favor of the view that Greek banks have undergone any 
systematic efforts to boost their current earnings by extending (higher 
interest bearing) credit to lower credit quality clients.  
 
The growth of performing loans may signal a positive phase of the 
business cycle if it is driven by demand factors, implying a negative 
association with NPLs. Alternatively, an overly aggressive loan supply 
policy on the part of banks that entails lending to lower credit quality 
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borrowers may establish a positive association with future problem 
loans (Salas and Saurina, 2002; and Quagliarello, 2007).  In our study, the 
estimates of the banking-specific VAR models imply a negative 
relationship between the lagged growth of performing loans and NPLs. 
Furthermore, the significance of the former variable appears to be 
diminishing in model specifications that include both macro and banking 
sector-specific determinants. These results do not allow us to infer that 
rapid loans growth today will necessarily lead to future borrower 
insolvency problems in the future. Again, this result is in line with 
analysis provided earlier in this document suggesting that, in the case of 
Greece, the primary cause of the sharp increase in problem loans after 
the outbreak of the crisis can primarily be explained by the huge 
contraction of domestic economic activity (and the sharp rise in 
unemployment) and not so much by the high rates of credit expansion 
experienced in the initial period following the adoption of the euro.  
 
In our VAR modeling framework, the solvency ratio, ETA, can be used to 
test the so-called “moral hazard hypothesis”, which implies a negative 
association between bank solvency and future NPL or, alternatively, the 
risk taking behavior on the part of banks (positive association). Our 
results do not seem to provide convincing evidence in favor of either of 
the above (see Table 2.5). In particular, as regards the moral former 
hypothesis, our results appear to be in line with Louzis et al. (2012). 
These authors provide the following explanation of the aforementioned 
result. The “moral hazard” hypothesis does not find support for the 
Greek banking system. A possible explanation is that the small sized 
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market for bank managers in Greece creates disincentives for reckless 
risk-taking and short-termism for reputation reasons.  
 
Table 2.5 VAR model for Moral Hazard Hypothesis (Source: The Authors) 
M5 
,q ty  
Δ[TNPL, 
RGDP,ETA]’ 
Δ[TNPL_HOUS,RGDP, 
ETA] 
Δ[TNPL_CORP, 
RGDP,ETA] 
Δ[TNPL_CONS,RGDP,ETA] 
D(TNPL(-1)) 0.56 
   
t-statistic 4.57 
   
D(TNPL_HOUSE(-1)) 
 
0.45 
  
t-statistic 
 
3.28 
  
D(TNPL_CORP(-1)) 
  
0.63 
 
t-statistic 
  
5.25 
 
D(TNPL_CONS(-1)) 
   
0.45 
t-statistic 
   
3.15 
RGDP(-1) -0.19 -0.17 -0.19 -0.27 
t-statistic -2.55 -2.34 -2.27 -2.29 
D(ETA(-1)) -0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.15 
t-statistic -0.57 0.56 -1.02 -1.16 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
t-statistic 1.93 2.35 1.40 2.59 
Causality Wald-Test (P-Value) 
 
D(TNPL) D(TNPL_HOUSE) D(TNPL_CORP) D(TNPL_CONS) 
RGDP 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
D(ETA) 0.57 0.58 0.31 0.25 
  
 
In addition, due to the small number of banks, regulatory authorities 
tend to have an accurate on-site overview of the riskiness of each bank’s 
loan portfolio and thus, they can intervene accordingly. As a result, the 
potential of bank managers causing high levels of NPLs due to moral 
hazard incentives is minimized. We broadly concur with the above 
reasoning and we add that the oversight of the domestic banking system 
has tightened significantly in recent years not only due to the fact that 
domestic financial stability has been a key pillar in the country’s three 
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consecutive bailout programmes since May 2010, but also because of 
the phasing in of the SSM mechanism since early 2014.11  
 
5.2.3  Are the effects of macroeconomic shocks uniform across different 
NPL categories? 
Our VAR models for the different sub-categories of NPLs (consumer, 
mortgage or corporate loans) broadly confirm the results documented in 
Louzis et al., (2012) as regards the estimated impact of the macro 
variables. As inferred by Tables 2.1-2.4, random shocks to key macro 
variables such as unemployment rate, growth of real housing prices and 
the real interest rate have much larger effects on corporate (and to a 
lesser extent on consumer) loans than on mortgage loans. As noted by 
the aforementioned authors, the lower sensitivity of mortgage loans on 
macro determinants and loan rates can be explained on the basis that a 
considerable portion of the latter category consists of fixed rate 
mortgage loans. Furthermore, home ownership is highly valued in 
Greece (and, in fact higher than the respective euro area average) and 
that may be considered as a social specificity. We broadly concur with 
these arguments and we add that, in contrast to a certain portion of 
outstanding consumer loans, mortgage loans are collateralized by the 
underlying property and thus, it is rather natural for borrowers to 
prioritize their payments to banks in periods of increased financial 
strains.  
                                                 
11
 In the context of the European banking union, Greece’s four systemic banks that currently control c. 
95% of total domestic banking-sector assets are now oversighted by the European Central Bank/ SSM.  
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5.2.4  NPL VARs for restructured loans   
Table 2.6 presents estimates for a number of VAR models that include 
the ratio of the outstanding stock of restructured loans to total loans (in 
first differences) as one of the endogenous variables.  
Table 2.6 Estimated VAR models for restructured loans in aggregate. (Source: The Authors) 
 
R1 R2 R3 
D(RTNPL(-1)) 0.03 0.04 0.08 
t-statistic 0.21 0.25 0.49 
RGDP(-1) -0.06 -0.03 
 
t-statistic -2.28 -1.00 
 
RHP(-1) 
   
t-statistic 
   
D(UNPL(-1)) 
 
0.13 0.15 
t-statistic 
 
1.64 2.48 
D(L_RIR(-1)) 
   
t-statistic 
   
D(LD_IRS(-1)) 
   
t-statistic 
   
PERFO_TL_GR(-1)) 
  
0.00 
t-statistic 
  
-0.32 
D(RTNPL(-2)) 0.01 
  
t-statistic 0.07 
  
RGDP(-2) -0.02 
  
t-statistic -0.69 
  
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistic 2.36 1.19 2.17 
Pseudo-Variables 
C12 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
t-statistic 
  
1.32 -0.25 -1.42 
   
Causalities Wald-Test (P-Values) 
 
R1 R2 R3 
D(RTNPL) 
 
0.62 
 
0.27 0.43 
 
0.94 0.05 
RGDP 0.04 
 
0.32 
 
0.93 
   
RHP 
        
D(UNPL) 
  
0.10 0.00 
 
0.15 
 
0.00 
PERFO_TL_GR 
     
0.51 0.19 
 
*Variables are expressed in either ratios or growth rates 
These findings are broadly in line with these produced by the macro and 
bank-specific VARs analyzed in the previous sections and confirm the 
  53 
primary importance of macroeconomic developments in determining 
the evolution of this particular category of loans. We believe that the 
behavior of restructured loans in Greece deserves closer monitoring and 
analysis, but we leave that for one of our future projects. 
6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
Understanding the determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) is an 
issue of primary importance for both macroeconomic and financial-
system stability. This paper utilizes a novel set of regulatory data for 
non-performing and restructured loans to decipher the major drivers of 
the sharp deterioration in private sector solvency in Greece following 
the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. Our empirical findings broadly 
confirm the results of a few earlier studies on the evolution of ex post 
credit risk in Greece and constitute a valuable input in designing 
appropriate policies to safeguard macroeconomic and financial systemic 
stability in euro area periphery economies that were particularly hit by 
the crisis. Apart from looking at some relevant hypotheses that have 
been widely tested in the relevant literature, our study examines some 
novel ones. Among others, these include what we call the “home equity 
cashing out” hypothesis, which examines the degree to which equity has 
been extracted from borrowers’ homes, especially over the period of 
strong domestic bank lending in the pre-crisis years.  
By and large, the most important finding documented in our study is 
that the primary cause of the sharp increase of non-performing loans in 
Greece following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis can be traced 
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back to the unprecedented contraction of domestic economic activity 
(and the subsequent spike in unemployment) in recent years. On the 
other hand, our results offer no convincing empirical evidence in support 
of a range of examined hypotheses assuming overly aggressive lending 
practices by major Greek banks or any systematic efforts to boost 
current earnings by extending credit to lower credit quality clients. 
Overall, our results urge for a swift stabilization of domestic economic 
conditions that would allow a cyclical peak in the non-performing loans 
ratio not far from its current level. The rigorous implementation of the 
conditionality underlying the new (3rd) bailout programme constitutes 
an important prerequisite for attaining this aim.  In this context, the 
implementation of agreed reforms for modernizing the county’s private 
sector insolvency framework and for moving towards a more efficient 
model for the management of NPLs is key for allowing a resumption of 
positive credit creation, by freeing up valuable resources that are 
currently trapped in unproductive sectors of the Greek economy.  
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